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NOTES
COMMERCE CLAUSE-STATES LOSE POWER TO PRESCRIBE HIGHWAY SAFETY REGULATIONS-Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 1309 (1981).
INTRODUCTION

Since Gibbons v. Ogden,1 courts have wrestled with the problem of state legislation which affects interstate commerce. This
problem is due to the fact that the Commerce Clause of the United
States Constitution is silent as to whether states can regulate interstate commerce in the absence of federal regulation.2 Some authorities argue that federal power is exclusive.3 Others argue that,
absent federal legislation, states are free to regulate interstate
commerce.4 The United States Supreme Court has taken a middle
ground, usually upholding nondiscriminatory state regulations in
areas which do not require uniform national standards.
The Supreme Court has been reluctant to overturn state highway safety regulations,' according them a "strong presumption of
validity."' 7 In particular, limitations on truck lengths have been
1. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
2. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3. "The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several states, and with the
Indian Tribes."
3. In Gibbons, supra note 1, at 198-200, Chief Justice Marshall leaned towards this view, but did not decide the question, since it was not necessary for the
decision. See P. BENSON, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 21
(1970).
4. Chief Justice Taney advocated this position in The License Cases, 46 U.S.

(5 How.) 504, 573 (1847); See L. TREBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

322

(1978).
5. Best & Co. v. Maxwell, 311 U.S. 454 (1940); Cooley v. Board of Wardens of
Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851); see J. NOWAK, et al., HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 244 (1978).
6. Mauer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); South Carolina State Highway
Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Sproles v. Binford,
286 U.S. 374 (1932).
7. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959).
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considered especially appropriate for state regulation. 8 But in the
recent case of Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp.,' the Supreme Court held unconstitutional as violative of the Commerce
Clause an Iowa statute generally barring sixty-five-foot twin-trailer
trucks from state highways. Kassel marks a departure from the
Supreme Court "hands-off" policy towards state highway safety
regulations and could further restrict states' powers to prescribe
such regulations.
THE CASE

An Iowa statute 10 generally prohibited the use of sixty-fivefoot twin-trailer trucks within the state, while allowing fifty-fivefoot single-trailer trucks and sixty-foot twin-trailer trucks.1 Respondent, Consolidated Freightways Corp., a common carrier operating in forty-eight states under a certificate of public convenience
and necessity, was unable to use its sixty-five-foot twin-trailer
trucks in Iowa. The carrier filed an action in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Iowa, averring that the
Iowa statute unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce by
increasing transportation costs without contributing to highway
safety. Respondent sought an injunction prohibiting Iowa from enforcing the challenged statute against the operation of sixty-fivefoot twin-trailer trucks on certain interstate highways and roads
furnishing access between such interstates and rest, food, fuel, and
repair facilities." Iowa claimed the regulations were reasonable
safety measures and, therefore, valid under its police power.' s
The District Court granted the injunction, finding the statute
unconstitutional because the evidence showed that the prohibited
twin-trailer trucks were as safe as the permitted single-trailer
trucks.' 4 The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir8. Mauer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); South Carolina State Highway
Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
U.S. -,
101 S. Ct. 1309 (1981).
9. 10. IOWA CODE ANN., 321.457 (1975):
11. The specific law in question reads as follows: 6. "No combination of three
(3) vehicles coupled together one of which is a motor vehicle, unladen or with
load, shall have an overall length, inclusive of front and rear bumpers in excess of
sixty feet."
12. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 475 F. Supp. 544, 546 (S.D.
Iowa 1979).
13. Id. at 549.
14. Id. at 553.
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cuit affirmed. 5 The United States Supreme Court, though divided
in its reasoning, affirmed (in a four-two-three decision), and agreed
that the Iowa statute violated the Commerce Clause of the
Constitution.'
HISTORY-IN GENERAL

The question of whether states could regulate interstate commerce first arose in Gibbons v. Ogden,'7 wherein Chief Justice
Marshall speculated that the power could be reserved exclusively
for the federal government.' s The Chief Justice did later recognize,
in Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co.," that states do have
police power to regulate local concerns, even though the regulations affect interstate commerce.10 In the interim between Gibbons
and Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Philadelphia,"2 the Court was
unable to formulate a test to distinqulsh between an impermissible
state regulation of interstate commerce and a permissible regulation pursuant to a state's police power."
In Cooley"8 the Court determined that the validity of an exercise of state power depends on the nature of the subject of the
regulation: if the item is such that national uniformity is needed,
federal power is exclusive; if the item is one of local concern requiring different treatment in different locales, states can regulate
in the absence of federal legislation."
Another test was enunciated in Smith v. Alabama," where the
Court drew a distinction between state regulations which directly
affect interstate commerce and state police power regulations that
15. Consolidated Freightways Corp. v. Kassel, 612 F.2d 1064 (8th Cir. 1979).
16. Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., U.S. -,
101 S. Ct. 1309
(1981).
17. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). A New York act granting two persons the
exclusive steamship navigation rights in New York waters was held violative of
the Commerce Clause, since Congress had licensed other vessels to trade in waters
which included New York waters.
18. Id. at 198-200.
19. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
20. Id. at 251-52.
21. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
22. See J. NOWAK, et al., HANDBOOK ON CONSTItUnONAL LAw 247 (1978).
23. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). A Pennsylvania law that required vessels to
use a pilot or pay a fee was upheld as not violative of the Commerce Clause.
24. Id. at 319.
25. 124 U.S. 465, 482 (1888). The Court upheld an Alabama statute that required the licensing of locomotive engineers.
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indirectly affect commerce. The former were deemed unconstitutional; the latter were declared valid. Forty years later, Justice
Stone, dissenting in Di Santo v. Pennsylvania,2 6 urged the abandonment of the direct-indirect test and the adoption of the balancing test, which became the majority rule in United States v.
Darby."
The balancing test is used today to determine the validity of
state statutes affecting interstate commerce. A recent Supreme
Court statement of the test is found in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc.:"0

[The] general rule [can] be phrased as follows: Where the statute
regulates evenhandedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental,
it will be upheld unless the burden posed on such commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one of
degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities.'
HISTORY-STATE HIGHWAY SAFETY REGULATIONS

Absent federal legislation, states may prescribe regulations
governing highway use if they do not place undue burden on interstate commerce, are reasonable and nondiscriminatory.' 0 The negative side of the Commerce Clause curtails state power, but absent
congressional action, states can regulate local matters in ways that
affect interstate commerce."s The Supreme Court has found that
state highway safety and conservation statutes, in particular, do
26. 273 U.S. 34, 44 (1927). The Court struck down a Pennsylvania statute
requiring steamship ticket vendors to obtain a license.
27. 312 U.S. 100 (1941). The Court upheld the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938.
28. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
29. Id. at 142. For the classic work in this area, see Dowling, Interstate Commerce and State Power, 27 VA. L. REv. 1 (1940).
30. Mauer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); South Carolina State Highway
Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
31. Railway Express Agency, Inc. v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); Mauer v.
Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940); South Carolina State Highway Department v.
Barnwell Brothers, Inc., 303 U.S. 177 (1938); Sproles v. Binford, 286 U.S. 374
(1932); Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135 (1927).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/5
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not violate the Commerce Clause."'
State vehicle size regulations have been consistently upheld on
the grounds that their purpose is to promote highway safety and
conservation, and the resulting effects on interstate commerce are
merely incidental."3 In Morris v. Duby," the Supreme Court upheld a 16,500 pound vehicle weight limitation and applied the rule
that uniform state highway safety and conservation regulations,
applicable to both interstate and intrastate vehicles, do not unconstitutionally burden interstate commerce.8 6 Similarly, in South
CarolinaState Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc.,"
a state statute prohibiting the use of trucks wider than ninety inches on state highways was upheld as not unreasonable7 and, therefore, not an undue restraint on interstate commerce.3
Despite language in Barnwell which suggests that the rational
relation test is the proper one to apply in determining states'
rights to issue highway safety regulations," the balancing approach
has been generally applied, particularly in recent cases. 83 Applying
this balancing approach in Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc.,"°
the Supreme Court held that an Illinois statute requiring trucks
and trailers to have contour mudguards equipped on their rear
wheels violated the Commerce Clause. The majority found that the
statute, though not discriminatory, unduly burdened interstate
commerce in that: (1) due to conflicting legislation in Arkansas,
mudguards would have to be changed in order for trailers to operate in both states (a time-consuming and sometimes dangerous operation); and (2) the statute seriously interfered with interlining
32. South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938); Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135 (1927).
33. South Carolina State Highway Department v. Barnwell Brothers, Inc.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938); Morris v. Duby, 274 U.S. 135 (1927).
34. 274 U.S. 135 (1927).
35. Id. at 143.
36. 303 U.S. 177 (1938).
37. Id. at 196. Use of ninety-six-inch wide trucks (the prevailing width)
would have left no room for passing on some roads.
38. "Since the adoption of one weight or width regulation, rather than another, is a legislative not a judicial choice, its constitutionality is not to be determined by weighing in the judicial scales the merits of the legislative choice and
rejecting it if the weight of the evidence presented in court appears to favor a
different standard." Id. at 191.
39. Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Bibb
v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
40. 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
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operations (the interchanging of trailers between two carriers).",
Justice Harlan concurred in the result based upon the District
Court's finding contour mudguards did not contribute to highway
safety.' The Court stated that state highway safety measures
carry a strong presumption of validity; furthermore, courts should
not usurp legislative functions by judging alternative safety measures.43 Only if the "total effect of the law as a safety measure in
reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or problematical as
not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate commerce free from interferences which seriously impede it," will the
court overturn a highway safety statute." Thus the Court balanced
the safety effect of the statute against the resulting burden on interstate commerce.
The Court used similar reasoning in Raymond Motor Transportation,Inc. v.Rice," a case strikingly similar to Kassel. In Raymond, the Court held unconstitutional as violative of the Commerce Clause a Wisconsin statute prohibiting sixty-five-foot twintrailer trucks on state highways." Appellants' introduced a great
deal of evidence to support their claim that the statute made no
contribution to highway safety." The State did not introduce any
safety evidence," and instead argued that the appropriate standard was the rational relation test: whether the statute bears a rational relation to highway safety." The Court disagreed and applied the balancing test citing the Pike rule,G' but emphasized the
narrowness of its holding in light of the overwhelming one-sidedness of the safety evidence.' The concurring opinion stressed the
narrow scope of the decision; neither Pike nor Raymond suggests
"that a similar balance would be struck when a State legitimately
'
asserts the existence of a safety justification for a regulation.' 5 It
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.

Id. at 527.
Id. at 530 (Harlan, J., concurring opinion).
Id. at 524.
Id., quoting Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945).
434 U.S. 429 (1978).
Id.
Consolidated Freightways Corp. was also an appellant-plaintiff in

Raymond.
48. 434 U.S. at 436.
49. Id. at 437.
50. Id. at 442-43.
51. Id. at 441.
52. Id. at 447.
53. Id. at 449 (Blackmun, J., concurring opinion).
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol4/iss1/5
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is against the background of the Raymond decision that Kassel is
now considered.
ANALYSIS

The plurality in Kassel recognized the same principles of law
as did the Court in Raymond: (1) the Court is most reluctant to
invalidate state highway safety regulations;" (2) "if safety justifications are not illusory, the Court will not second guess legislative
judgment about their importance in comparison with related burdens on interstate commerce;"' 5 (3) challengers of state highway
safety regulations must overcome a "strong presumption of validity;"' 6 (4) regulations that only marginally affect safety and substantially interfere with interstate commerce are invalid under the
Commerce Clause; s7 and (5) the Court's inquiry requires a weighing process-"a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of
the state regulating concern in light of the extent of the burden
imposed on the course of interstate commerce.""
Applying these principles, the plurality concluded the Iowa
statute unconstitutionally burdened interstate commerce. s"
Though the plurality stated, "[t]his case is Raymond revisited,"
an important difference exists between the two cases. The Court in
Raymond found that the state "made no effort to contradict...
evidence of comparative safety with safety evidence of its own;
"it virtually defaulted in its defense of the regulation as a safety
measure." 2 By contrast, all three federal courts in Kassel acknowledged that Iowa zealously presented safety arguments and introduced voluminous evidence to support its safety claim.68
Although the plurality acknowledged that Iowa made a better
effort to support the safety rationale than did Wisconsin in Raymond, it nevertheless accepted the District Court's finding that the
101 S. Ct. at 1315.
- U.S. at -,
55. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1316, quoting Raymond Motor Transportation,
Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 449 (1978) (Blackmun, J., concurring opinion)).
56. Id., quoting Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959).
57. Id.
58. Id., quoting Raymond Motor Transportation, Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429,
441 (1978).
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 434 U.S. at 437.
62. Id. at 444.
101 S.Ct. at 1331-32 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting opinion).
63. - U.S. -,
54.
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evidence established that the prohibited twin-trailer trucks were as
safe as the permitted single-trailer trucks. " The plurality also accepted the District Court's finding that the statute substantially
burdened interstate commerce in that it increased transportation
costs and miles driven, because respondent had to reroute its truck
around Iowa or use additional trucks to move the same quantity of
goods through the state." Thus, in applying the aforementioned
legal principles, the plurality used the balancing test and concluded that respondent overcame "the strong presumption of validity" accorded the statute by demonstrating that the safety justifications were illusory (the statute only marginally affected
highway safety) and the regulation substantially burdened interstate commerce. 6"
The concurring opinion did not rely on the safety arguments;
instead, it reviewed the legislative history and concluded that
Iowa's purpose in refusing to allow the longer trucks on its highways was to deflect through traffic-an unconstitutional discrimination against interstate commerce." In 1974, the Iowa Legislature
voted to increase the truck length limitation to conform to the
standards of surrounding states," but the Governor vetoed the legislation."' The legislative response to the veto was the passage of a
"border cities exemption" which permitted cities near state borders to allow sixty-five-foot twin-trailer trucks while limiting
trucks to sixty feet elsewhere throughout the state. 70 Because the
64. Id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1316. Iowa's evidence demonstrated that the prohibited trucks took longer to pass, could only be backed for short distances, and
were more likely to jackknife than permitted fifty-five-foot single-trailer trucks.
The District Court and the Supreme Court plurality found the longer passing
time and limited backing ability irrelevant on interstate highways. As for the
jackknifing factor, the plurality noted that the prohibited sixty-five-foot twintrailer trucks are less likely to jackknife than the permitted sixty-foot twin-trailer
trucks. In addition, respondent introduced accident statistics that demonstrated
no significant difference in the accident, injury and death rate of the prohibited
longer trucks as compared with similar rates for the allowed fifty-five-foot singletrailer trucks. Id. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1316-17.
65. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1318.
66. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1320.
67. Id. at -, 101 S. Ct. at 1322 (Brennan, J., concurring opinion).
68. Iowa House File 671 (1974).
69. In his veto message, the Governor noted that the bill, "would benefit only
a few Iowa-based companies while providing a great advantage for out-of-state
trucking firms and competitors at the expense of our Iowa citizens." Governor's
Veto Message of March 2, 1974, reprinted in App. 626.
70. IowA CODE ANN. § 321.457(7) (West Supp. 1981).
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concurring justices found the purpose of the Governor and legislature was to deflect through traffic, they declared the regulation
unconstitutional. 7 '
The dissent relied on the rational relation test. Justice Rehnquist wrote that once the Court determines that the state law is a
valid safety measure, the only balancing the Court should do is to
determine whether "the asserted safety justification, although rational, is merely a pretext for discrimination against interstate
commerce." 2 He concluded Iowa's evidence demonstrated that the
statute was a rational safety measure, not an attempt to discriminate against interstate commerce. 7a
The dissent points out several weaknesses in the reasoning of
the plurality and concurring opinions. First, the plurality declared
Iowa's safety justifcations to be illusory because they have limited
applicability to interstate highways.7 ' The injunction granted by
the District Court, however, permits the trucks to travel limited
distances on roads furnishing access between rest stops and the interstates. 75 The plurality ignored the characteristics of these access
roads in rejecting Iowa's asserted safety justifications. Thus, it is
possible that Iowa's safety justifications are applicable to these access roads and the longer trucks could add dangers to highway
traffic on these roads. Since all courts considering the case ignored
the characteristics of these roads, it appears the granted injunction
was overbroad.
More importantly, both the plurality and concurring opinions
erroneously relied on the Governor's veto message and the "border
cities exemption" to find an impermissible motive to discriminate
against interstate commerce.7 6 Iowa's sixty-foot limit became law
in 1963 when few states permitted sixty-five-foot twin-trailer
trucks. Because most states had similar regulations, few carriers
used the longer trucks, so Iowa's statute did not impede interstate
commerce. By the time the Kassel action began, all surrounding
states had increased their length limitations." Iowa, for whatever
71.

-

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at
101 S.Ct. at 1326-27 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting opinion).
Id. at
101 S.Ct. at 1327-34 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting opinion).
Id. at
10% S. Ct. at 1317.
475 F. Supp. 544, 554 (S.D. Iowa 1979).

76.

-

U.S. at

-,

101 S. Ct. at 1323 (Brennan, J., concurring opinion).

-,
-,
-,

U.S. at

-,

and

-, 101 S. Ct. at 1319 and 1323.

77. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.861 (West Supp. 1981); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 95 /2,
§ 15-107 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 304.170 (Vernon Supp.
1981); NEB. Rav. STAT. § 39-6,179 (Supp. 1979); S.D. CODIFPID LAWS ANN. § 32-22Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1981
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reasons, decided not to increase its limitations. The effect of the
Kassel decision, is to declare Iowa's law unconstitutional, not because it was invalid when passed, but because, by 1979, factors
outside the state combined to discourage interstate truck travel
through Iowa. Such factors-the passage of longer truck length
limitations in surrounding states and increased carrier use of
longer trucks-occurred independently of any action by Iowa. The
impermissible purpose found by the plurality and concurrence results, therefore, not from enacting protectionist legislation, but
from not enacting new legislation. 8
Kassel goes further than any previous Supreme Court decision
which invalidated state highway safety regulations. It is the only
case in which the Court has struck down a truck length limitation
when the state submitted evidence demonstrating safety justifications for the regulation. Though the plurality did not address the
effect of this decision on other states' vehicle length limitations,
the implication of Kassel is clear: the seventeen states7 9 that still
prohibit sixty-five-foot twin-trailer trucks on their interstates must
discover new safety evidence to justify such restrictions if they
wish to successfully defend them against Commerce Clause challenges. Since the characteristics of interstate highways throughout
the country are generally uniform, 0 unless safety evidence can be
found other than that which Iowa presented, it appears that those
seventeen states will be unsuccessful in defending Commerce
Clause challenges to their shorter truck length limitations as applied to interstate highways.
CONCLUSION

In holding Iowa's truck length limitation unconstitutional because the state failed to increase it to conform to the regulations of
surrounding states, thereby resulting in a burden on interstate
commerce, the Supreme Court has sent state legislatures a message: when vehicle size regulations on interstate highways are in10 (Supp. 1981).
78. See

-

U.S. at -,

101 S. Ct. at 1334 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting opinion).

79. Doubles are prohibited in Maine, New Hampshire, Vermont, Massachusetts (except turnpike), Rhode Island, Connecticut, Pennsvlvania, West Virginia,
Virginia, Tennessee, North Carolina, South Carolina and Alabama. Doubles in excess of fifty-five feet are prohibited in New York (longer permitted on turnpike,
New Jersey, Mississippi, and Georgia).
80. The Secretary of Transportation must apply geometric and construction
standards uniformly throughout all the states. 23 U.S.C. § 109 (b.) (1976).
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volved, the judicial deference traditionally given to state highway
safety regulations may no longer be extended. Unless states can
clearly demonstrate valid safety justifications for their regulations,
minority states may have to conform their truck length limitations
(when applied to interstate highways) to those of the majority of
states.

Despite the aforementioned flaws in the plurality and concurring opinions, it appears this decision was necessary because, as
respondent demonstrated, by 1979, Iowa's statute did substantially
burden interstate commerce. 81 One final question remains: when
will the Court strike down state legislation, valid when passed, that
due to statutory changes in other states, eventually burdens interstate commerce? Kassel indicates that the past validity of a statute is of little importance; the key factor is its current effect on
interstate commerce coupled with its ability to effectuate a legitimate local interest. It appears that the balancing approach will be
applied to weigh states' justifications supporting statutes which affect interstate commerce against the resulting burden on such
commerce in light of the most current conditions. There appears to
be little cause for alarm, however, among states' rights advocates.
As long as changing conditions do not appreciably reduce the local
public interest or the statute's effectuation of such interest, the increased burden on interstate commerce will probably not -be
enough to tip the scales in favor of invalidation. Restated in terms
of the Kassel decision, if the Court had found Iowa's safety justifications to be legitimate, the statute would probably have been upheld despite its increasing burden on interstate commerce.
Like state legislatures, Congress should also discern a message
from the decision: it is time to enact federal legislation governing
the use of carriers on interstate highways. In 1980, the Senate
passed a bill that would have pre-empted the field of truck lengths
by setting a national limit of sixty-five feet, but the House of Representatives took no action on the bill.82 Until such legislation is
enacted, the Supreme Court will continue to make essentially legislative decisions concerning carrier use of the interstate highway
system.
Larry C. Harris

81. U.S. at -,
101 S. Ct. at 1318.
82. S.B. 1360, 96th Cong., 2d Seas., 126

CONG.

Ruc. S1661, 1665 (1980).
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